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BOOK REVIEWS
ONE MAN'S STAND FOR FREEDOM. By Irving Dilliard.
New York: Random House 1963. Pp. 504. $7.50.
Much can be said against compilations of the works of men whose
career and production of more works continues unabated. Selectivity
and evaluation are necessarily tentative.
Irving Dilliard, former staff member of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, has attempted to overcome that difficulty in his book on Justice Hugo LaFayette Black by choosing only opinions relating to the
Bill of Rights and arranging them chronologically. The result is a
collection of seventy-five opinions, sans citations and footnotes, made
readable for the layman and referable for the lawyer. Of the 97 Justices who have been appointed to the Supreme Court, only 16 have
served as long as Justice Black. The collection in Dilliard's book
corroborates his conclusion that "beginning with the very foundations
of the Republic, no one else has stood up so resolutely over so long a
period in times so trying for the sacred freedoms of the individual
American under the Bill of Rights."
Black's first significant civil liberties decision was rendered in
1938, in reversing a conviction of two counterfeiters who appeared
without counsel at time of trial and sentencing. Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458. He brushed aside the contention that they had failed
to demand counsel at the trial, by stating: "The purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a right to counsel is to protect an accused from
conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights, and the guaranty would be nullified by a determination that an accused's ignorant failure to claim his rights removes the protection of the Constitution...."
In 1942, Black dissented in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, when the
majority would not compel a state court to require counsel for a defendant in a serious criminal case. "The Sixth Amendment makes
the right to counsel in criminal cases inviolable by the Federal Government," he wrote. "I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment
made the Sixth applicable to the States."
And he was consistently maintaining the same posture in 1962. In
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, nearly a quarter of a century
after Johnson v. Zerbst, he was still insisting that it was time "to
abandon this vague, fickle standard for determining the right to
counsel of a person prosecuted for a crime in a state court" and make
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it mandatory in every case "whether it is their life, their liberty, or
their property which is at stake in a criminal prosecution."

Right-to-counsel cases are merely one of numerous examples of
the theme Dilliard urges: that in term after term, the same issues

come up repeatedly. The form is slightly different, the names and locale vary, but Bill of Rights tests have arisen again and again, "some
have been won and then lost, others have been lost and then won."
Throughout his judicial career, Black has spoken up for the individual and his rights. He has been remarkably unwavering-with two
noteworthy exceptions, and in one he publicly recanted.
In Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, Black
went along with the 8-1 majority (only Harlan Stone dissented)
compelling Jehovah's Witnesses school children to salute the flag,
despite contrary religious scruples, or to be expelled from school.
That was in 1940. By 1942, he had misgivings, as did Justices
Douglas and Murphy. The three made a confession of judicial error unparalleled in court history. Their dissent in Jones v. Opelika,
316 U.S. 584, related, "Since we joined in the opinion in the
Gobitis case, we think this is an appropriate occasion to state that
we now believe that it was also wrongly decided." They added gratuitously that our form of government "has a high responsibility to
accommodate itself to the regligious view of minorities, however unpopular and unorthodox those views may be."
Yet there are limits to that concept, Black was to reason out further the very next year. By then Justice Rutledge had succeeded
Byrnes, and in another flag salute case, West Virginia v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, Jehovah's Witnesses children won the right to refrain
from saluting. In a concurring opinion, Black noted that "no wellordered society can leave to the individuals an absolute right to make
final decisions, unassailable by the State, as to everything they will
Religious faiths, honestly held, do not free inor will not do ....
dividuals from responsibility to conduct themselves obediently to
laws which are either imperatively necessary to protect society as a
whole from grave and pressingly imminent dangers. . . ." In this
instance, mere words of loyalty, he found, did not require such obedience. Our domestic tranquility did not demand little children to participate in a ceremony which causes them fear of spiritual condemnanation. "If," he wrote, "their fears are groundless, time and reason
are the proper antidotes for their errors."
In the foregoing cases, there was a demonstrable metamorphosis.
Not so, however, in the other judicial aberration in Black's career,
the Korematsu case, 323 U.S. 214. He chose to find the Japanese
exclusion order during the war was not "because of racial prejudice,"
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and that even though there was no evidence of the petitioner's disloyalty, it was proper to exclude him from the coast because "there
were disloyal members of that population whose number and
strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained." This, of
course, was hardly protective of Fred Korematsu's rights as an individual American citizen. It stamped him with collective blame for
the conduct of others whose only relationship with him was common racial ancestry. Justice Roberts found "a clear violation of constitutional rights"; Justice Murphy wrote that in the absence of martial law the exclusion order went over "the brink of constitutional
power" and Justice Jackson held this to be an unlawful military
expedient.
Black departed from principle, and rationalized that this was wartime, that the court cannot second-guess the military from the calm
perspective of hindsight, and besides, "hardships are part of war,
and war is an aggregation of hardships." This was not one of Mr.
Justice Black's lofty contributions to jurisprudence.
It might be noted parenthetically that Black held a Japanese
resident alien could not be deprived of a civil claim against an individual (Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69), but even there he suggested that an all-powerful government might take such steps.
With the foregoing exceptions, Dilliard's compilation reveals a
steadfastness to principle that justifies the tributes paid to Mr. Justice
Black in 1962 on his 25th anniversary as a member of the court.
It is inevitable that there will be more laudatory evaluations in the
period ahead as he approaches the inexorable termination of a magnificent judicial career.
When Black refused in 1962 to vacate orders of the Court of
Appeals compelling admission of James Meredith to the University
of Mississippi (Meredith v. Fair, 371 U.S. 828), he was no
"Johnny-come-lately" to the cause of equal rights for Negroes. From
the outset of his judicial career, he became a champion of minorities in their striving for constitutional guarantees. The second opinion
he wrote was Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, in which a murder
conviction was reversed because of systematic exclusion of Negroes
from jury service. Undeviatingly he held in Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, that "if there has been discrimination, whether accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously, the conviction cannot stand"; he
voted for certiorari in Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70, involving the right of an Indian to be buried in a chartered cemetery
and concurred in Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, that the First
Amendment protects freedom of association regardless of race.
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Most significant, perhaps, have been Black's opinions in the broad
field of freedom from unwarranted governmental interference. That
the individual is paramount as against an overreaching bureaucracy
-even in the area of law enforcement-has been his consistent
belief. Thus we find him protecting peaceful picketing as a form of
free speech in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor, 312
U.S. 287; permitting criticism of courts in Bridges v.California, 314
U.S. 252; voiding a conviction because of an inquisitional confession in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143; permitting public employees to participate in public affairs and political campaigns
(United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75); holding California's alien land law violated the Equal Protection Clause (Oyama
v. California, 332 U.S. 633); prohibiting summary deportation of
aliens, in peace or war (Ludecke v.Watkins, 335 U.S. 160); speaking out against test oaths (American Communications Association v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382); holding teachers should not be penalized for
their thoughts and associates (Adler v.Board of Education, 342 U.S.
485); finding that a House committee exceeds its power when it
exposes for the sake of exposure (Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109); ruling that the exclusionary rule applies to state prosecutions (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643).
The other area in which Black's influence has been manifest is
First Amendment cases involving religion. While in Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, he found the First Amendment did
not prohibit New Jersey from using tax funds to transport pupils to
parochial schools, in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S.
203, he held religious instruction in public schools violated principles of separation of church and state. A majority agreed with him.
But in Zorach v.Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, he was in the minority, insisting "released time" was also invalid. His words were simple and
eloquent: "State help to religion injects political and party prejudices into a holy field. It too often substitutes force for prayer, hate
for love, and persecution for persuasion. Government should not be
allowed, under cover of the soft euphemism of 'cooperation' to steal
into the sacred area of religious choice."
Dilliard's book concludes with an interview with Justice Black by
Professor Edmond Cahn of New York University Law School on
April 14, 1962. In it, Black confirms the views expressed in his
controversial James Madison lecture that there are absolutes in the
Bill of Rights. "I want this Government to protect itself," he said,
but "I think it can be preserved only by leaving people with the
utmost freedom to think and to hope and to talk and to dream if
they want to dream. I do not think this Government must look to

1964)

BOOK REVIEWS

force, stifling the minds and aspirations of the people. Yes, I believe
in self-preservation, but I would preserve it as the founders said, by
leaving people free. I think here, as in another time, it cannot live
half slave and half free."
Certainly it must be said that the public acts of Hugo LaFayette
Black square remarkably well with his words.
Stanley Mosk*

IN SEARCH OF CRIMINOLOGY. By Leon Radzinowicz.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
1962. Pp. vii, 254. $4.75.
At the 1963 California State Bar Convention, Chief Justice Phil
S. Gibson, in the course of an address to the profession, stated:
"History will judge the quality of a civilization by the manner in
which it enforces its criminal laws." This remark by the Chief Justice
indicates the larger problem to which the author of the new book
IN SEARCH OF CRIMINOLOGY has addressed himself.
In a sweeping appraisal of the origins and growth of criminology,
which he defines as "a study of crime, its conditioning, its prevention,
and its treatment," the author uses a broad canvas of time and space.
Placing the origins of what we would concede to be modern criminology in turn-of-the-century Italy, he traces its development through
France, Austria, Germany, Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries.
The impetus of this study, both in connection with its impact on the
criminal law and its teaching in the various colleges and law schools,
passed then from pioneer Italy through Central Europe and eventually to America. Initially the Italian positivists negated free will in
their concept of criminal responsibility and based their view upon
the needs of society, concerning themselves not with the guilt of
the offender but with his potential danger to the community. It is
interesting to note that in this area discussion continues to be of
paramount interest today, as witness the expanding interest in
mental illness as it relates to criminal responsibility. California has
recently created a Governor's Commission for just such a study; it is
probably, in my opinion, the most expanding and complex concept
in our criminal law.
The author outlines the development in Austria of a methodology
of investigation under Hans Gross, where a criminal clinic was estab*Attorney General of the State of California.

